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DISCRETIONARY ACTION OF PARK BOARD IN
EXCLUDING NEGRO GOLFERS NOT
SUBJECT TO MANDAMUS
Board of Park Commissioners of Baltimore City
v. Murphy'
The City of Baltimore maintained four golf courses,
three of which were used by white persons and a fourth
which was reserved for Negro golfers. Negroes had al-
ways been restricted to the use of a particular course,
except during a short period in 1942 when this restriction
was removed and Negro and white players were admitted
indiscriminately to all courses. This period of trial re-
sulted in the Park Board's rescinding its order for Negro
players' unrestricted use of all the City's golf courses, the
reason assigned by the Board for such action being that
the very limited number of Negro golfers making use of
the four courses indicated that the facilities of the Carroll
Park course, allotted exclusively to Negro players, were
ample for their needs. After restrictions were again in
effect, petitioner presented himself at one of the courses
reserved for white golfers and was refused admission in
accordance with the Park Board's order. He then filed a
petition for a writ of mandamus, complaining that the
course reserved for Negroes was inferior to courses open-
to white golfers. He maintained that the Park Board
was not authorized by law to segregate players of his race,
and that exclusion from golf courses of the City- solely
because of his color was a deprivation of equal protection
of the laws guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.
Petitioner in his writ prayed that respondents be re-
quired and directed to sell greens fee tickets at each and
every golf course owned by the Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore to all those who applied for such greens fee
tickets, irrespective of race, creed, or color. Upon verdict
of a jury, the lower Court ordered the writ to be passed as
prayed. This order was reversed by the Court of Appeals
on the ground that there were lacking the necessary ele-
ments to maintain mandamus, a clear legal right to per-
formance of the act demanded and an imperative duty on
the part of the respondent to do the act required.2
'29 A. (2d) 253 (Md., 1942).
2 HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEUGAL REMEDIES (3rd Ed., 1896) Sec. 21.
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In dealing with the assertion by the petitioner of the
right to be admitted to every golf course owned by the
City, the Court considered segregation of the white and
Negro races as treatment so firmly established as constitu-
tional that it called for no protracted discussion. They
cited the case of Plessy v. Ferguson,3 wherein the Supreme
Court upheld a Louisiana statute requiring separate rail-
way accommodations for colored and white passengers.
In that case the Supreme Court had said: "The distinction
between laws interfering with political equality of the
Negro and those requiring the separation of the two races
in schools, theatres, and railway carriages has been fre-
quently drawn by this Court."4
While insisting on the constitutionality of segregation,
the Court did not fail to recognize the limitation on this
treatment by ruling that complete exclusion from every
golf course in the City or relegation to an inferior course
would be a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This recog-
nition was presaged by the Court's holding in the Murray
case5 where mandamus was recognized as the proper rem-
edy to compel admittance of Negro citizens to the law
school of the State University on the ground that no equal
facilities for legal education of Negroes were provided else-
where within the State.
The limitation on this right of segregation pointed by
the Maryland Court was recently emphasized by the
United States Supreme Court in the Mitchell case,6 where
a colored passenger holding a first class ticket had been
compelled to ride in a second class car and was thus
denied standard conveniences available to 'first class pas-
sengers. The Court held: "If facilities are provided, sub-
stantial equality of persons travelling under like condi-
tions cannot be refused."7
163 U. S. 537, 545 (1886).
'Ibid.
University of Maryland v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 483-84, 182 A. 590
(1935) ; Hart v. State, 100 Md. 595, 601, 60 A. 457 (1905).
a 313 U. S. 80, 97 (1940).
The defense of the Railroad in this case had been that the number of
colored passengers wishing first class accommodations did not warrant
furnishing a first class car for them. The Court dismissed this argument
as without merit, saying, "Comparable volume of traffic cannot justify
denial of a fundamental right of equality of treatment." Is the statement
of the Maryland Court in the instant case that "nine holes for the small
number of players might, for instance, be found upon inquiry to be ade-
quate for them" at variance with this particular part of the ruling in the
Mitchell case?
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It was the absence of the second element necessary to
the remedy, the imperative duty on the part of the re-
spondent, which the Court stressed in arriving at the deci-
sion that the writ would not issue. Referring to the City
Charter" as authority for the Park Board's delegated
powers, the Court pointed out that the Board had discre-
tion in making rules and regulations for the government
and preservation of order in the City parks, and that segre-
gation of the races being normal treatment in this State9
the Board needed no additional ordinance to authorize it to
apply this treatment, implied as an incident of its Charter-
given powers. It was the administrative board which had
been chosen to exercise its discretion as to the size and
number of courses necessary to satisfy the needs of the
golf playing public, and as to whether a separation of white
and colored players would promote order and an enjoy-
ment of golfing facilities by both. "So far as the Board
has discretion, the writ of mandamus cannot issue to con-
trol their action", said the Court.10
This recognition that mandamus will not lie to enforce
a discretionary power is universal. There are innumerable
cases in which this doctrine is expressed in varying state-
ments. Courts repeatedly say the writ cannot perform
the function of a writ of error; or that it cannot issue to
revise judicial action, but can only compel the perform-
ance of ministerial functions. The rule, then, is plain, but
in its application there is obscurity and confusion. No
clear-cut line exists between discretionary and ministerial
function. The cases make it evident that the courts have
had great difficulty in drawing the distinction in individual
cases.
In the case of Kendall v. United States," where Con-
gress had directed the Postmaster to make credit entries
in an account found to be just by the Solicitor of the
Treasury, the Court held this act was precise and definite,
and the duty ministerial, with no discretionary quality,
hence it required the Postmaster to make the entries.
8Balt. City Charter (1938) Sec. 119.
9 Williams v. Zimmerman, 172 Md. 563, 567, 192 A. 353 (1937).
10 The same rule was applied in Maryland State Funeral Directors' As-
sociation v. State Board of Undertakers, 150 Md. 294, 133 A. 62 (1926).
Earlier Maryland cases supporting the doctrine of administrative finality
are: Green v. Purnell, 12 Md. 329, 336 (1858) ; Devine v. Belt, 70 Md. 352,
354, 17 A. 375 (1889) ; Madison v. Harbor Board, 76 Md. 395, 25 A. 337
(1893) ; Wailes v. Smith, Comptroller, 76 Md. 469, 477, 25 A. 922 (1893).
11 12 Pet. 524 (U. S., 1838).
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Compare this decision with that of Chief Justice Taney
in the case of United States v. Seaman 2 where relator, a
printer of the United States Senate, applied for mandamus
to compel the Superintendent of Public Printing to deliver
to him certain documents for printing, printing of which
he claimed to be entitled by act of Congress. The Chief
Justice refused the writ on the ground of the officer's dis-
cretionary power, basing such classification on the fact
that the officer had first to ascertain in which house the
order to print was issued and then the usage of Congress
in printing the document in one or more parts. This
obliged him to form a judgment before he acted, said the
Chief Justice, and hence the case was not one for man-
damus.
Again, we find the Iowa Court" holding mandamus
will issue to compel public officers to perform the min-
isterial duty of returning money illegally extracted, under
a statute later declared unconstitutional; while the Mary-
land Court14 refused to issue mandamus for the return of
a tax on oyster commission merchants, which tax had been
held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court
as a burden on interstate commerce. The requirement of
an official approval for payment of money collected under
an unconstitutional tax was not a requirement for certifi-
cation of an amount due, but was a discretionary power
placed in the officer to safeguard the state treasury, the
Maryland Court ruled.
In reaching its conclusion the Court defined, at length,
ministerial and discretionary duties, quoting the earlier
case of Wailes v. Smith" where the Court had said:
"While this distinction (of ministerial and discretionary
powers) will be found to run through all the cases there is,
it must be admitted, some conflict of opinion in this coun-
try, at least, as to what constitutes, strictly speaking a min-
isterial duty as distinguished from a discretionary duty
within the meaning of the rule and it may not be easy to
reconcile the principles which are supposed to govern these
decisions."
Mr. Spelling, in his work on Extraordinary Relief,16
likewise recognizes the difficulty of drawing the distinc-
12 17 How. 225 (U. S., 1854).
13 Commercial National Bank v. Pottawattamie County, 168 Iowa 501,
504, 150 N. W. 708 (1915).
14 Foote v. Harrington, 129 Md. 123, 98 A. 289 (1916).
15 76 Md. 469, 477, 25 A. 922 (1893).
16 SPuLINGo, EXTRAORDINARY REn (1893) Sec. 1396.
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tion, stating that the dividing line between these duties
is not sufficiently agreed upon by the authorities to admit
of the statement of a definite rule on the subject.
While courts recognize the difficulty of distinguishing
discretionary and ministerial powers, a survey of the cases,
very briefly indicated by the preceding illustrations, does
not show any trend toward development of clearer classi-
fication schemes which would promote more uniform rul-
ings. In considering the classification necessary before
the Court issues or denies the writ, it cannot but be noted
how impossible it is to separate the clear legal right to the
act demanded from the necessity for a duty of mandatory
nature, emphasized by each court by insistence on the min-
isterial duty before the writ will issue.
In many instances in determining whether the duty
sought to be enforced is one involving discretion or one
of a purely ministerial character, courts have stressed the
nature of the office of the respondent rather than the
nature of the act sought to be done. This may be traced
to the famous case of Marbury v. Madison.7 There, the
relators had applied to the United States Supreme Court
for a rule against the Secretary of State to show cause
why mandamus should not issue commanding him to de-
liver to the relators their commissions as Justices of the
Peace of the District of Columbia. The Court refused to
interfere, upon the ground that its original jurisdiction was
limited by the Constitution. While the question of juris-
diction was the sole one which the Court was called upon
to decide, the case is cited to this day as the leading author-
ity in support of the jurisdiction by mandamus over minis-
terial officers, because of the careful analysis of the distinc-
tions between ministerial and discretionary duties. In this
case the contention was that mandamus to the Secretary
of State was mandamus to the President and so could not
issue. Clearly separating the powers of the office and the
act of its officer which the writ sought to command, Chief
Justice Marshall pointed out the dual capacity of the
officer, as agent of the President, wherein his powers were
discretionary, and as a keeper of seals, recorder of deeds,
or of commissions, in the performance of which acts he
was a ministerial officer of the people of the United States.
A ministerial officer having public duties to perform is
compellable by law to do his duty, the Court held. "It is
not by the office of the person to whom the writ is directed
17 1 Cranch 137, 170-71 (U. S., 1803).
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but by the nature of the act to be done that the propriety
or impropriety of issuing mandamus is to be determined",
was the Court's ruling. Would a stricter adherence to such
a rule result in a more consistent policy in the issuance
of the writ?
Whatever the answer, in any case where the act de-
manded involves constitutional rights, emphasis on the act
demanded of the officer is obviously what a petitioner is
likely to insist on, rather than on the nature of the office
which the respondent holds. In the instant case, obvi-
ously, the petitioner did rely heavily on the nature of the
act he demanded, rather than on the nature of powers
conferred on the Park Board by the City Charter. It
hardly needed stating by the Court that the Park Board
had discretion as to the number and types of golf courses
adequate for the golf playing public, and that it was within
the Board's sound judgment to determine the choice of
their location and the persons who could play on them.
The choice of an administrative body to exercise its judg-
ment on matters involving particular knowledge and skill
is so uniformly recognized and the finality of these admin-
istrative determinations is so clearly upheld by the Mary-
land Court and the United States Supreme Court,18 that
the petitioner's case of mandamus would be surprising in
the face of the doctrine of administrative finality, except
for a reliance on the point that the act of admitting
Negroes to all golf courses is one which no officer could
refuse.
Again, let us refer to contentions in Marbury v. Madi-
son,19 where the Court, in replying to argument that Madi-
son was an agent of the President and, as such, his acts
must be discretionary, stated: "Where he is directed by
law to do a certain act affecting the absolute rights of indi-
viduals . .. the performance of which the President can-
not lawfully forbid . . . it is not perceived on what ground
the courts of the country are further excused from the
duty of giving judgment that right be done to an injured
individual, than if the same services were to be performed
by a person not the head of a department." This state-
ment is a recognition that public officers, whatever the
nature of their office, or from whatever source they derive
their authority, are entrusted with the performance of
II State v. Latrobe, 81 Md. 222, 31 A. 788 (1895) ; U. S., ex rel. Chicago
Gt. Western R. R. Co. v. I. C. C., 294 U. S. 50, 59 (1935). See also cases
cited 8upra, n. 10.
19 See supra, n. 17.
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certain duties concerning which they are vested with no
discretionary powers, and which are positively imposed on
them by virtue of express law. Such duties, by whatever
law they may be required, being unattended with any
degree of official discretion, were regarded by the Court
as ministerial in their nature, and the officers at whose
hands their performance was required, as to such duties,
were ministerial officers.
Petitioner chose mandamus in the face of recognized
distinctions between ministerial and discretionary powers.
Was he, in effect, saying the act he demanded was minis-
terial because the respondent had no discretion to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment, and as to the act of admitting
Negroes to all golf courses he was a ministerial officer,
whose acts a Court could command? Such a contention
would justify the choice of mandamus in the fact of the
doctrine of administrative finality, but it again illustrates
the inseparable quality of the petitioner's right and the
respondent's duty. To establish the clear ministerial qual-
ity of the act which petitioner demanded, he had first to
establish the clear unconstitutionality of segregation as a
State policy. This burden he could not meet.
Plessy v. Ferguson20 stands squarely in the path of a
mandatory duty on the part of the respondent to admit
the petitioner to all golf courses of the City. The Court's
citation of this case, coupled with its earlier ruling in the
Murray case21 that complete exclusion from facilities open
to white persons is a denial of equal protection, places the
Maryland Court's rulings on sound constitutional grounds.
On principles of administrative law, the Court's refusal
to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative
body chosen for that purpose is well supported by hold-
ings of the presently constituted Supreme Court, which
goes far in its reiteration that where discretion is reposed
in an administrative agency and this discretion has been
exercised, Courts are powerless by mandamus to compel a
different conclusion.22
20 See supra, n. 3.
21 See supra, n. 5.
21 U. S., ex rel. Chicago Gt. Western R. R. Co. v. I. C. C., 294 U. S. 50, 59
(1935) ; Rochester Telephone Co. v. U. S., 307 U. S. 125, 146 (1939).
